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Turkey has been closely observing the Iranian nuclear program and its bilateral, 
regional and global implications since 2002. As one of the most important neigh-
boring countries, Iran’s defense policy has always been an issue of great 
significance for Turkish policy makers. In the last one and a half decades, Turkey 
has been both directly and indirectly in pursuit of shaping the outcome of Iran’s 
nuclear program and the negotiations between Iran and the world’s major powers. 
For example, in 2010, Turkey and Brazil catered a nuclear fuel swap agreement 
designed to help Iran build a peaceful nuclear program and at the same time pre-
vent weaponization of its nuclear capabilities. Although this initiative was 
considered to be highly promising in terms of what it could have provided to Iran 
and the rest of the world, the UN Security Council Permanent Members and 
Germany (P5+1) did not welcome it. The deal died shortly after Turkey and Brazil 
promoted it due to P5+1’s opposition. After that experience, Turkey’s direct 
involvement in negotiations has been rather low-key. 
Turkey’s reaction to signing a ‘framework deal’ between Iran and six major 
world powers has been generally very positive. On April 3 2015, Turkey’s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu declared that “We are very happy to hear that 
this deal was signed,” immediately after the deal was reached. Çavuşoğlu stated 
that Turkey was against a nuclear weapons program in the region while she 
supported each country’s right to use peaceful technology. More specifically, 
Turkey’s reaction to the Iran-P5+1 agreement is threefold, including security, eco-
nomic and political concerns. Turkey’s perspective on each policy area is deline-
ated in more detail below. 
Security-related concerns 
Turkey’s reaction to alleged weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program has been 
cautious. Although Turkish policy-makers have not directly blamed Iran of deve-
loping nuclear weapons and generally accepted that Iran’s program is for peaceful 
purposes, they too are against Iran's ‘going nuclear’.  
Primarily, the Turkish government suggests that if Iran built nuclear weapons, 
other powers would follow the same course, which would result in a nuclear arms 
race in the Middle East. Turkish officials posit that such a race would significantly 
decrease security for the region and at the same time result in substantial financial 
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losses. Turkish officials have always been critical of alleged Israeli nuclear weap-
ons in the Middle East and have demanded the discontinuation of the Israeli 
nuclear weapons program as well. Therefore Turkey’s preference is in line with ‘a 
nuclear free MENA’. Domestically, a new and rather small-scale debate has 
emerged as to whether Turkey should develop its own nuclear program in case of a 
nuclear arms race in the region or whether the extended deterrence provided by 
NATO would still be sufficient for Turkey’s defense. Knowing the costs of such an 
arms race, Turkish officials prefer not to have a nuclear neighbor, which, at a 
critical juncture, would pave the way for a path dependency towards a nuclear 
arms race in the region. 
Yet, Turkey has not appeared to be very alarmed about the nuclear program in 
the last decade. Perhaps this is because what really alters Turkish threat percep-
tions is the Iranian missile program and Turkey’s rather underdeveloped air 
defense system. Turkish officials deem the country’s air defense system to be not 
developed enough to defend Turkey against threats in a region full of conflict and 
armament. The recent developments in Turkey have led the government to refer to 
Article 4 of the NATO charter and request the alliance to augment the air defense 
capabilities. Since January 2013, a group of Dutch and German batteries have been 
operational in Southeast Turkey against spillover from the Syrian civil war. Turkey 
has also considered buying missile defense systems from China, and some mem-
bers of the alliance heavily criticized that foreign policy behavior. Turkey’s argu-
mentation is that the country needs its own air defense system in such a volatile 
region. Although Iran is not directly mentioned in policy papers or statements, it is 
known that Iran’s advanced medium range ballistic missiles are of vital concern for 
Turkey.  
Economic concerns 
The economic relief for Iran that will result from a deal is going to be a develop-
ment of utmost importance in terms of its positive externalities for Turkey. Turkey 
has repeatedly directed criticism against the international sanctions against Iran 
and how those sanctions hurt Turkish-Iranian trade and economic relations. Curr-
ently, the trade volume between the two neighbors is at about 15 billion US Dollars 
per year. Both Turkish and Iranian officials have emphasized that this volume 
could easily go up to 30 billion dollars in a short period of time, but that the scale 
of engagement has been negatively affected by international sanctions. Due to 
Turkey’s exports being included in the list of international sanctions, Turkey’s 
exportation to Iran has diminished threefold. With respect to the current develop-
ment, Turkish businesspeople see an opportunity in areas where the sanctions will 
be lifted. 
The second most immediate effect of this deal becoming a reality is the expected 
drop in the price of gold and energy. Turkey is a net energy importing country. 
Turkey imports most of its energy from Russia and Iran. Maintaining natural gas 
and oil imports and decreasing the trade deficit with Iran by growing exports are 
crucial for Turkey. Therefore, the lifting of sanctions against Iran is a pivotal step 
for Turkey.  
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Third, if the economic sanctions end, Turkey can pursue its regional policy of 
becoming an energy hub between the energy rich east and the energy-poor EU 
countries. Iran’s contribution to Turkey’s focus of integrating transit projects within 
its own territory is relevant both in terms of energy supply and geostrategic necessi-
ties. For example, a proposed pipeline would transfer Iranian gas via Turkey to 
European markets. If Iran is re-integrated into the international society with all eco-
nomic cooperation schemes, this would also benefit Turkey.  
Furthermore, Iran’s normalization is likely to boost the border trade ratio 
between Eastern Turkish and Western Iranian provinces. This border trade has 
been a huge economic contribution to border cities on both sides.  With respect to 
this mutually beneficial interaction, the Iranian normalization process may pro-
mote a further increase in the number of tourists visiting Turkey as well as an 
expansion of health tourism to Iranian hospitals. In addition to the above-men-
tioned positive ramifications, the lifting of sanctions is also expected to result in 
Turkey’s strong construction sector's receiving important tenders on the other side 
of the border.  Lastly, in the immediate period following the discontinuation of the 
sanctions, Iran may ask Turkey to export goods for critical sectors such as 
medicine, automobile/airline industries, textile, furniture, consumer goods and 
woodwork production.  
Given the importance of Turkish-Iranian trade for both sides and Turkey’s 
support to Iran during the implementation of the sanctions against the latter, 
Iranian officials have been confronted with the question whether Turkey will 
receive preferential treatment once the sanctions are lifted. The usual answer from 
Iranian officials is that they will continue to cooperate with Turkey on economic 
matters as before. However, the Turkish side is concerned about competing with 
large Western European and North American firms in various fields. Perhaps the 
best terms of cooperation will be achieved in areas where Turkey has a comparative 
advantage, e.g. Iran can use certain goods with lower costs such as agricultural 
technologies. 
To sum up, Iran is an important trade partner of Turkey and lifting international 
sanctions will augment Turkish-Iranian economic relations to a great extent. There-
fore, both the Turkish government and business representatives have welcomed 
the framework deal. 
Political concerns 
Possibly the most significant question regarding the end result of a one-and-a-half 
decade long stand-off is whether this deal will ‘normalize’ Iran’s foreign relations. 
In other words, the key question is whether the Iranian government will stop being 
a revolutionary force and instead decide to be an internationally legitimate state 
integrated into the world system. In the best-case scenario, in Henry Kissinger's 
words, Iran will stop being a revolutionary cause and decide to be a state. In the 
worst-case scenario, the Iran P5+1 deal will not work and the Iranian revolutionary 
zeal will further destabilize the region. 
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If the best-scenario becomes reality, Turkey will enjoy better neighborly 
relations and inhabit a more stable region. Turkey has been negatively affected by 
the turbulence in the region since 2003. The invasion of Iraq followed by the civil 
war and Arab uprisings since 2011 have also destabilized Turkey’s southern border 
security, as well as its economic relations. Turkish policy-makers hope that the 
framework deal with Iran will stop Iran’s support for non-state actors in Syria, 
Lebanon, Yemen, and the rest of the Middle East. If Iran is well integrated into the 
global governance structures and the state aims at maintaining legitimacy, they 
may – at least – decrease the level of support for groups such as Hezbollah and 
their belligerent activities. If Iran is on board for a peaceful solution with regard to 
the civil war in Syria, Turkey would greatly benefit from such a contribution. In 
short, if Iran stops being a geopolitical risk, this will greatly benefit Turkey.  
The downside of such a scenario for Turkey would be the increasing popularity 
of Iran in the region. Iran and Turkey have been in a sort of competitive friendship 
in the last half millennium. If Iran were re-integrated into the world system, this 
would bring Iran a higher level of international cooperation, investments and 
friendship. In such a positive scenario, despite the benefits to Turkey, Iran’s rising 
importance may also threaten Turkey’s stance in the region. Especially in a time 
where Turkey does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, Syria and Egypt, 
Iran’s improved relations with regional countries as well as with the EU and the US 
may be a cause for concern in Ankara. The Turkish foreign policy elite has warned 
that this deal may bring back a pre-1979 balance to the region, throughout which 
Iran and Turkey competed for US and Western cooperation. In sum, Turkey is 
concerned about losing its importance in regional matters both for Western 
countries as well as vis-a-vis regional actors.  
Domestic Criticism  
The framework deal is generally celebrated by the Turkish policy makers as well as 
the foreign policy elite such as intellectuals, academics, journalists and business 
people. A small number of skeptic intellectuals have voiced concerns whether Iran 
would really adhere to the rules of the game or would again just buy time to 
continue with the nuclear program. However, this group has been small and not 
very vocal. Most of the domestic criticism has come from the opposition elite and 
the political parties, fearing that with the new framework deal there would be a 
great chance that Turkey will lose its role in the region and its status in important 
world capitals as the go-to actor when MENA affairs are concerned. Therefore, the 
critics suggest that Turkey must repair its worsened relations with Egypt, Israel, 
Syria and the Iraqi central government and should not let Iran take over her role as 
an important regional power. To this end, critics have warned Turkey to refrain 
from joining the anti-Iran coalition formed in Yemen by Saudi Arabia and to return 
to its path of good neighborly relations in the region. In that context, the 
framework deal’s possible effect on Turkey may be the manifestation of more 
cooperative relations with the regional countries.  
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